25 SEPTEMBER 2013
‘Women, Business and the Law 2014′ measures how national laws, regulations and institutions differentiate between women and men in ways that may affect women’s capacity to work or set up and run businesses.
Dr Augusto Lopez-Claros, Director of Global Indicators and Analysis at the World Bank and IFC said: “In 79 countries the law restricts the types of jobs that women can do. These jobs are often in industries that are higher paying and that creates a pay gap. In the twenty-first century many of these restrictions no longer make sense.”
The Secretariat also presented ‘Gender, Trade and Public Procurement Policy‘, which focuses on how policies for procuring goods and services for government departments can be used effectively to enhance business opportunities for women.
The procurement market often makes up to 10-15% of the GDP of developed countries and can amount for as much as 30-40% of GDP of developing countries. The report looks at how public procurement policies can be used as a tool to open up the market to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), including women’s businesses, which are often in the informal sector.
It includes case studies and lessons from four Commonwealth countries: Australia, India, Jamaica and Kenya.
Interim Director in charge of Gender, Health and Education at the Secretariat, Esther Eghobamien said: “The research has demonstrated the impact of public procurement policy as a vehicle for enhancing opportunities for SMEs and women-owned business. Any growth in that sector will translate into real gains for women living below the poverty line.”
May 23rd, 2013
Mr Samuel Sellas-Mensah, Chief Executive of the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), has said developing countries need well qualified procurement professionals to manage the challenges in the current global economic environment.
He said: “The current global economic environment, which is evident in high levels of unemployment, increased perceptions of corruption, inadequate hard and soft infrastructure and devastating effects of climate change, makes it imperative for the continent to have well qualified procurement professionals”.
The event is under the theme: “The Strategic Role of Procurement Professionals in the Development of Africa.”
He said when public procurement was effectively managed by well qualified professionals, there was bound to be rippling effects that could lead to improvement in the economies of developing countries.
Mr Sellas-Mensah said though most factories in Africa might be as productive as those in China and India, the prices of their goods were normally not competitive due to the poor management of their value chains and the lack of requisite infrastructure.
He said there was the need for investment in the training of well qualified procurement professionals who would be able to eliminate all forms of waste and inject efficiency into their sourcing and acquisition process.
Mr Sellas-Mensah said qualified procurement professionals would provide the continent with efficient, professional, accountable and transparent functions, by using their expertise to negotiate and tap into the global supply chain to fit into the principles of procurement.
He said procurement professionals were able to conduct effective ‘supplier and spend’ analysis that would inform managerial decision and align procurement strategies to organizational goals.
Mr Sellas-Mensah said there was a strong correlation between corruption and bad procurement practices and its debilitating effect on African economies, saying countries practicing effective procurement systems were on the path of curbing corruption.
He said investing in the growth and development of procurement professionals on the continent would be a sure way for Africa to realize its dreams and aspirations.
The Chief Executive of the PPA said his outfit had over the years made some achievements due to the development of new procurement monitoring and evaluation tools, publication of manual to operations of public procurement practitioners and training modules of procurement practitioners and the high ratings by the World Bank.
“Our experiences and achievements for almost a decade can attest to the strategic importance of procurement professionals in national development.
“Since public procurement constitutes 20 per cent of GDP of most developing economies and absorbs 50 per cent of their revenue exclusive of government wage bills, it is believed that the procurement function is critical in delivering both functional and horizontal objectives of any development agenda,” he said.
What’s a cash-tight government to do when it wants to modernize a hospital, build a railway, or expand the power grid to reach underserved areas? It might explore outside, private sources of financing—that’s where public-private partnerships (PPPs) come in. The acronym has a promising ring to it, yet going back to the 1970s, its impact has been mixed. At their best, PPPs can provide rapid injections of cash from private financiers, delivery of quality services, and overall cost-effectiveness the public sector can’t achieve on its own.
But at their worst, PPPs can also drive up costs, under-deliver services, harm the public interest, and introduce new opportunities for fraud, collusion, and corruption. Our experience at the World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency is that because PPPs most often are geared toward providing essential public services in infrastructure, health and education, the integrity risks inherent in these sectors also transfer to PPPs.
On April 17, the Integrity Vice Presidency convened a public discussion on corruption in PPPs (pdf) bringing together finance, energy, and fairness-monitoring perspectives. Looking at the landscape, in the last eight years, 134 developing countries have implemented PPPs in infrastructure, and in the last decade the World Bank has approved some $23 billion lending and risk guarantee operations in support of PPPs.
Opening the event, World Bank Managing Director Sri Mulyani recounted examples from her previous life as Indonesia’s Minister of Finance. She reminded the audience that while fraud in PPPs can seem abstract, the quality, safety, and human costs are very real—such as when a bridge crumbles after only five years, though it was supposedly built to last 15.
CBS News State Department correspondent, Margaret Brennan, moderated the discussion and did not let panelists get away with being too polite. She tried to pinpanelists (pdf) down on which countries consistently faced the biggest corruption problem, and how we can fix it. As my colleague Rashad Kaldany, Vice President and COO at IFC said, “This happens everywhere in the world, all countries, bar none.” The problem is global, which is why the solutions also should be similarly global and applicable in diverse situations.
If there was a theme to the discussion, it was the desire to level the playing field with global standards on PPP transparency. Roger Bridges, president of Knowles Consulting in Canada, suggested the World Bank design a certification system for transparency and governance. Receiving that certification would be completely voluntary, but also demonstrate a credible commitment and capacity for internal governance. Roger said that ultimately the certification could be rolled into an overall grading system for PPP participants. Participants might, for example, receive 10 out of a possible total of 100 points for being certified. A carrot—not a stick.
Rashad suggested an initiative in the integrity area modeled on the Equator Principles. Start with a few, major international players who agree to standardized practices and principles in PPPs. Once established, media and civil society groups can help mobilize others to sign on, gradually expanding adherence to the principles until they become a broadly accepted norm of conduct.
Establishing new norms sounds like it could take forever, but attitudes and norms can change faster than you think—Paul Clifford said in the past 8 to 10 years he has seen “difficult conversations” with clients about conforming to the Equator principles’ environmental and social standards become accepted as “automatic.”
Corruption is deliberate, serious and bad business. Based on the discussion yesterday, I believe there would be broad support for what I like to call Global Integrity Principles. PPPs are inherently opaque and risky because they are often long-term, complex financial arrangements. Those risks can be reduced if the terms, costs, and benefits are made more understandable and accessible to governments, private parties, and consumers.
The questions we want to address at the World Bank are, specifically: How should integrity due diligence be adapted for PPPs? What do integrity principles in national PPP laws look like? What should regulators do to review concession and other related arrangements for red flags? Are additional disclosure requirements needed to flush out politically exposed persons? And finally, how do we obtain more effective public scrutiny of PPP deals throughout the PPP project cycle?
No doubt, we have a number of difficult and complex issues to sort out. The way forward is to embrace optimism, even though in 1911 Ambrose Bierce described it as an intellectual disorder.
- Public to bear costs of state-guaranteed profits in LRT privatization (bulatlat.com)
- Public-private partnerships a winning strategy (miamiherald.com)
- PPP Law Panel: ‘The state needs the investor and not the other way round’ (dailynewsegypt.com)
- Corruption, time and indispensability (kaieteurnewsonline.com)
- Ministry of Finance promotes PPP agreements (dailynewsegypt.com)
- Japan bank targets PPP acceleration (vietnamnews.vn)
- Stephen King: PPPs need better ways to handle risk (nzherald.co.nz)
By Odidison Omankhanlen – Lagos
April 22, 2013
The Director-General, Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), Mr Emeka Eze, has said over N420 billion had been saved for Federal Government in the last 15 months through the activities of the bureau on contract valuation.
Ezeh, who was speaking at the opening of a retreat for Chief Executive Officers in Federal Government’s Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) organised by the Bureau, in Lagos, at the weekend, explained that the said fund was recovered after valuation of contracts that were submitted by contractors, stating that the reduction in contract sum further emphasized the core value of BPP as the drive of public procurement and prudence in public expenditure.
He assured that the bureau would continue to ensure that there was transparency in the bidding process for contracts in the country, stressing that all competent contractors would be given a level playing field to demonstrate their capacity and pass through open competitive bidding process enshrined in the Act.
He explained that the BPP would continue to work hard to ensure the cost of doing business in the country was reduced through the elimination of multiple registration and pre- qualification as well as tendering process that should be increased to give chance for equal competence and capabilities.
“It is important to highlight the Bureau’s effort in promoting transparency, accountability, efficiency and fairness in public sector procurement and the Transformation Agenda of the present administration. The default procurement method remains competitive Tendering, as it is, is the surest guarantee for quality and transparency which PPA 2007 envisages. The direct procurement and selective tendering are the exception rather than the norms,” he said.
On the relevance of the retreat, the BPP boss said it was to identify the deficiencies in the 2012 budget implementation process, so that this year’s budget could be more successful, adding that the participants would also have opportunity to know the procurement process.
He noted that through similar retreats for other public officers, they were now beginning to see public funds as monies to be spent with care, and with high sense of responsibility, adding that these gains were a resultant improved budget implementation and performance in terms of project delivery.
“The benefits of the programme cannot be over emphasized because as it develops, the cost of doing business in the country would reduce through the elimination of multiple registration and pre-qualifications in the various MDAs. The quality of prequalification and tendering process should increase at the end of the day coupled with the better grouping of contractors, consultants and service providers of equal competence and capabilities,” he stated.
Ezeh noted that with the classification of contractors and consultants by the bureau, there will be increased discipline in the Federal procurement process, noting that only capable and competent contractors and service providers would become identifiable and considered for deserving jobs.
He was optimistic that the bureau was working assiduously to consolidate on- going collaboration with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Washington based International Law Institute (ILI) and the Federal University of Technology (FUTO), Owerri, to establish a public procurement research centre.
Also speaking at the event, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions, Hon Uzor Azubuike, explained that efficient public procurement is vital to the development of the country as it regulates the developmental capital component of the annual budget.
“Contracts should not be awarded at inflated prices. We should stop giving specific contractors more contracts than they can handle.
Contractors that have records of abandoning contracts should be blacklisted. The BPP should not stop at procurement, but go ahead to monitor contracts awarded to ensure Nigerians get value for money,” he advised.
January 11, 2013
According to the report launched this morning at the Hilton Addis, focusing on the level of corruption in the country in different sector sectors, the government needs to apply standards to Ethio Telecom that are in line with Ethiopia’s Public Procurement Proclamation.
The report, “Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia”, in its subtopic that assessed the level of corruption in the telecom sector also stated that absence of uniform procurement standards is one of the major causes of corruption, among others.
The report highlighted that the vendor financing contract entered into by the then ETC (Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation now named Ethio Telecom) in 2006 appears to be highly unusual. “…This brief study should not be seen as an investigation or interpreted as alleging in itself that corruption has necessarily occurred. However, the circumstances as perceived both by stakeholders and by independent observers do raise serious questions about the control of risks in this sector.”
The stakeholders of the then 1.5 billion US dollars vendor financing argue that ETC’s financial requirements were not provided in detail to those suppliers (other than possibly the winning supplier –China’s ZTE) that had been approached to consider providing such financing. The report also stated that there is no evidence of a formal tender procedure for the finance package.
“The supplier selected by the ETC to supply the finance package that suited the ETC’s purposes. The equipment supply element of the vendor financing contract was not put out to competitive tender.”
The report stated that generally the contract was not in accordance with the ETC’s procurement procedure and no competitive tender for the contract and subcontracts.
“Difficulty in measuring technical compliance: By appointing one supplier without competitive tender, the ETC has no opportunity to assess the degree of technical compliance of the supplier’s equipment. The contract was also inappropriate and went through unclear procedures for ensuring technical quality and competitive pricing,” according to the report.
In addition, the report further mentioned that Ethio Telecom is vulnerable to corruption because it is under government monopoly.
Health, education, water, justice, construction, land and mining are also the sectors surveyed by the report sponsored by the World Bank, Canada International Development Agency, UK Aid and the government of the Netherlands.
“Some of the recommendations of the report are under implementation,” said Ali Suleman, Commissioner of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC). While the report also recalled that in January 2008, the FEACC 2008 brought charges against a former ETC CEO and 26 former ETC executives for allegedly “procuring low-quality equipment from companies that were supposed to be rejected on the basis of procurement regulations.”
World Bank country Director, Guang Zhe Chen, on his part stressed that the purpose of the study is conducted to support evidence-based policy formation.
- Ethiopia: Is ECX at it again? ECX’s upcoming procurement bid (apperi.org)
- Ethiopia: Anti-Corruption Commission Launches New Web Portal (africapotashblog.wordpress.com)
- Ethiopian Hydro-dam Performance Attracting Global Financiers (africapotashblog.wordpress.com)
- Ethiopia Economic Digest: A Post-Meles 2012 Review (africapotashblog.wordpress.com)
Nazret.com November 29, 2012
By Wondwossen Mezlekia,
The Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) is currently conducting a high-ticket international procurement – the first of its kind since a multi-million dollar bid was busted in 2010 due to alleged fraud and corruption during the bidding process.
The bid for the supply, installation, and maintenance of a futures trading software that ECX floated back in 2010 was marred by dishonest maneuvering, seemingly to favor the Sri Lanka based company, Millennium IT, and World Bank withdrew ECX’s award proposal and cancelled the loan. The loan was part of what the government had borrowed from International Development Association (IDA) for the purposes of financing the Rural Capacity Building project.  Strangely, the said futures trading software was not needed to begin with and would have been running idle today had ECX purchased it in 2010, because the government is, as it has always been, decidedly against price speculations and hence would not allow Forwards and Futures trade operations that the software was supposed to support.
ECX is once again preparing to spend some of the money that the government has borrowed from the Investment Climate Facilities for Africa Trust (ICF) and other donors on an online trading platform at an estimated total cost of more than $10 million (exact amount and details are withheld). Arguably, much like the futures trading software, the merit of this investment is also questionable, especially in light of ECX’s and the government’s current priorities, the details of which is for another article. The purpose of this article is to equip concerned citizens with the information and resources they need to be on their guard against corruption, and to put on notice anyone who may be under temptation or illusion to fraudulently benefit from the upcoming bid. Although there is no evidence so far, it is better to prevent corruption than to prosecute it.
According to ECX’s budget proposal that was reviewed for this article, almost 76% of the budget for the online trading project will be covered by funds from the World Bank’s Rural Capacity Building Project. ICF has agreed to cover the financing gap of about 24% of the total estimated budget through a grant. The procurement is being conducted under the auspices of the outgoing officers, Dr. Eleni Gebre-Medhin, Solomon Edossa, and Ahadu Woubshet who only have an advisory role under a one-year contract, even though the new CEO, Anteneh Assefa and other officers have already assumed their positions.
The Invitation for Bid (IFD) for the procurement of a core system for online trading, including its risk management, surveillance, and clearing components (Procurement Reference Number ECX-ICF/G/002/2012) was advertised on November 1, 2012 on national papers and online, including on dgMarket.  Accordingly, the bid will be opened in two phases: the technical bid will be opened on November 30, 2012 at 10:30 am local time at ECX Media Room, and the opening date for the financial bid will be announced thereafter. The bidding will be conducted in accordance with the open International Tendering Procedures contained in the public procurement guidelines of the Government of Ethiopia, the ICF Guidelines, and the International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures.
The past record of the government in detecting or prosecuting suspected fraud and corruption is dismal. On the other hand, donor’s guidelines have proved to be reliable sources of defense in past disputes involving international procurement bids. Among these, ICF’s guidelines appear to be by far clearer and strictly dictating how the borrower and bidders alike should behave during the bidding process. For example, ICF not only offers to provide assistance of audit services and monitoring (Article 1.6), but also explicitly states the steps that it takes to fight fraud and corruption (Article 1.7).
Review, Assistance, and Monitoring
1.6 ICF and auditors appointed by ICF shall review the Grant Recipient’s selection process for the selection of suppliers proposed by the Grant Recipient in the Procurement Plan to ensure compliance with the Grant Agreement and these Guidelines. The Grant Recipient shall retain all documentation with respect to each contract during project implementation and up to two [y]ears after the closing date of the Grant Agreement. This documentation would include, but not be limited to, the signed original of the contract, the analysis of the respective proposals, and recommendations for award the record of justification, the capabilities and experience of the suppliers, for examination by ICF, auditors appointed by ICF or by its suppliers.
Fraud and Corruption
1.7 It is ICF’s policy to require that Grant Recipients, as well as suppliers and their subcontractors under ICF-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the selection and execution of such contracts. In pursuance of this policy, ICF will reject a proposal for award, cancel the portion of the Grant allocated to a contract; sanction a supplier if it at any time determines that the tender process was marred by corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, coercive, or obstructive practices. In addition, ICF will have the right to require that, in contracts financed by an ICF grant. a provision is included requiring suppliers to permit ICF to inspect their accounts and records and other documents relating to the submission of proposals and contract performance and to have them audited
Articles 2.1, 2.15, and 2.21 of ICF’s guidelines also require borrowers to conduct bidding by following a two-tiered approach and based on Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS), which uses a competitive process that takes into account the quality and the cost of the services in the selection of the winner. The guidelines prohibit evaluators of technical proposals from having access to the financial proposals until the technical evaluation is concluded.
The Selection Process
2.1 QCBS uses a competitive process among short-listed firms that takes into account the quality and the cost of the goods and supplies in the selection of the successful supplier. Cost as a factor of selection shall be used judiciously. The relative weight to be given to the quality and cost shall he determined for each case depending on the nature of the assignment.
Evaluation of Proposals: Consideration of Quality and Cost
2.15 The evaluation of the proposals shall be carried out in two stages: first the quality, and then the cost. Evaluators of technical proposals shall not have access to the financial proposals until the technical evaluation is concluded. Financial proposals shall be opened only thereafter. The evaluation shall be carried out in full conformity with the provisions of the RFP.
Articles 2.11 and 2.12 if IFC’s guidelines even go as far as to dictating the minimum time that grant recipients need to allow between the different stages of the procurement process. For example, the minimum time-limit for receipt of proposals should not be less than 40 days from the date of the advertisement, except in emergency situations.
While these and other Articles of ICF’s guidelines appear to provide reasonable controls around each segment of the procurement processes, any control is only as strong as the people applying them. It is thus imperative that concerned citizens and bidders get engaged and attentively monitor all international bidding processes conducted at ECX and other institutions in order to prevent misappropriations of foreign aid in Ethiopia.
Report suspected fraud and corruption to Investment Climate Facility for Africa at firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com; the World Bank Group’s Integrity Vice Presidency at firstname.lastname@example.org; or Transparency International at email@example.com.
 http://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do~8547811 (dgMarket is an international portal for tenders and procurement opportunities from governments and international organizations)
 The time elapsed between the date of advertisement and the bid opening date appears to be shorter than the minimum time limit set under Articles 2.11 and 2.12 of ICF’s Procurement Guidelines
BY PAUL FAUVET,
The project dates back to 2003, and was intended to completely rehabilitate both the Sena line, running from Beira to the Moatize coal basin in Tete province, and the Machipanda line, from Beira to Zimbabwe.
This involved farming out management of the two lines to the Beira Railroad Company (CCFB), in which 51 per cent of the shares were held by the Indian consortium RICON (Rites and Icon International), and 49 per cent by the Mozambican port and rail company, CFM.
RICON was the dominant partner and was supposed to be in charge of the complete reconstruction of the Sena Line (which had ceased running in 1983, thanks to comprehensive sabotage by the apartheid-back Renamo rebels), and of bringing the Machipanda line up to scratch.
The World Bank was initially enthusiastic about the project, and backed it up with a loan of 104 million US dollars. The tender won by RICON was supervised by the World Bank and the award to RICON was approved by the bank. The concession contract between the government and Ricon/CCFB stated that the entire system should be rehabilitated by January 2009, and that RICON would not only manage CCFB, but would be the main contractor on rebuilding the Sena line and its bridges.
The Mozambican authorities, and CFM, soon began to sound the alarm. Ricon kept missing deadlines, and its work failed to observe technical standards. CFM and the Independent Engineer hired to assess progress both warned about these matters, but the World Bank was conspicuously silent – the Bank’s unit supervising the project took no notice of the warnings.
Ricon argued that it could not meet the January 2009 deadline for completing reconstruction of the Sena line because of the floods in the Zambezi valley in 2007 and 2008. So the government gave Ricon a further six months.
That deadline ran out, and the Sena line was still nowhere near complete. The government tried to switch the management of CCFB to CFM, but RICON used its majority on the CCFB board to block this.
When President Armando Guebuza made a state visit to India in 2010, he discussed the transfer of management power from RICON to CFM. The Indian government agreed, according to Transport Minister Paulo Zucula, but RICON still resisted. Finally, in December 2010 the Mozambican government decided to rescind the contract with RICON.
The World Bank has now issued an Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), dated 27 June, which is a damning indictment of the World Bank staff involved in the project. It describes the outcome of the project as “unsatisfactory”, the risk to development outcome as “substantial”, and the bank performance as “unsatisfactory”. The performance of the borrower (the Mozambican government) is described as “moderately unsatisfactory”.
The main project objectives were not remotely achieved. Thus the original goal was to have the Sena line able to carry one million tonnes of cargo a year by the end of 2009. In fact, the line was only opened to coal traffic on 8 August 2011, with freight running at 266,000 tonnes a year – just 27 per cent of the initial target 20 months late.
International traffic on the Machipanda line was supposed to rise from 480,000 tonnes a year in 2004 to 650,000 tonnes in 2009. In fact, if fell, by 2011, to 387,700 tonnes. “The potential for traffic on this line is good (and evidence by the increase in road traffic), but poor infrastructure prevents the railway from getting its share”, commented the ICR report.
All 317 kilometres of the Machipanda line were supposed to be rehabilitated. But in fact not a single kilometre was upgraded. “No rehabilitation and very little (if any) maintenance during the concession period”, remarked the report. “The Machipanda line has deteriorated further and is in fact in worse condition that at the start of the project”.
The overall reliability of the Beira rail system was supposed to improve substantially. The target was that the percentage of track under temporary restrictions should fall from 10 per cent in 2004 to two per cent in 2009. In fact, the figure rose to 16.6 per cent in 2011.
As the conflict between Ricon and the Mozambican authorities deepened, the World Bank’s Project Implementation Unit (PIU) ended up taking Ricon’s side, despite the clear evidence that it was in violation of its contractual obligations. The report admits that “The PIU eventually acted on behalf of the contractor. Despite all the documented delays, the contractor was never penalized”.
That was not the fault of the Mozambicans – the report adds that “all requests by CFM for the PIU to take action against the Contractor for poor execution of the works were ignored”.
One shocking example was that RICON was allowed to relax specifications for ballast to be used on the Sena line despite protests by both CFM and the Independent Engineer.
Furthermore, “the best skilled engineers were prematurely sent back home by the Concessionaire (CCFB), and subsequently replaced by incompetent staff, with the approval of the PIU. Despite repeated objections by the CFM and the Mozambican government, no action was taken to reverse these decisions”.
World Bank staff on the ground just covered up the problems. The report comes close to accusing them of lying to the Bank’s head office. It says “Remarkably, all of the Bank’s supervision reports during the critical stages (2005-2010) gave the project an overall rating of ‘satisfactory’ or ‘moderately satisfactory’. Despite the virulent correspondence between the parties to the contract and the persistent negative reports by the Independent Engineer, the project ratings were never revised and as a result corrective action was never taken”.
The report concludes that the Bank staff had no idea what they were doing – though it puts this in somewhat more diplomatic terms: “The Bank supervision team did not have the requisite engineering skills and competencies to make sense of the implications of the issues raised by the Independent Engineer”.
There were “significant discrepancies” between the Implementation Status Reports produced by the Bank staff and the reports from the Independent Engineer. Thus the Bank staff, in late 2007, were cheerfully forecasting that the Sena line’s first phase would open in early 2008, while at much the same time the Independent Engineer was warning that there was no chance to meet the completion deadlines.
Only when there was a change in the Bank’s supervision and management staff (in 2010) did the World Bank wake up to the seriousness of the situation. It was too late – the loan had already been disbursed.
There had been a chance to change course with the mid-term review in June 2008. By then the project had an alarming cost overrun of 50 million dollars, and construction work was around eight months behind schedule. But the Bank team excused the increase costs as “understandable”.
The ICR report notes “Rather than addressing the incompetence of the Concessionaire as a major bottleneck, the mid-term review pointed to the failure in negotiations over the coal tariff (which was a fairly recent development) and the threat of termination by he government as the main risk to Project progress. This was a missed opportunity to consider Project changes and re-direction”.
The overall message of the report is very clear – after a two year delay and cost overrun of over 50 million dollars, the key goals of the project were not met. The Sena line is not handling the expected level of traffic, and the condition of the Machipanda line is worse than before the project began.
The ICR report expresses a worry that the collapse of the CCFB concession “might trigger a negative perception of public-private partnerships in Mozambique that could reverberate to other sectors or even other countries in the region”.
The Bank is ideologically committed to public-private partnerships – but outsiders might note that the Beira Railway Project is just an extreme example of the recurrent theme in such partnerships that the public sector takes the risk while the private partner walks away with the profit.
The World Bank has blacklisted and fined two subsidiaries of Alstom SA, a French engineering company, after the companies allegedly offered a K781 million bribe to an entity controlled by a former senior government official (not named) for consultancy services for a World Bank-financed power-rehabilitation project in Zambia in 2002.
The Alstom subsidiaries, Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network Schweiz AG in Switzerland, will pay K50.1 billion in restitution and be blocked from bidding on World Bank contracts for up to three years.
Commenting on the matter yesterday, Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) president Reuben Lifuka said it was shocking that in 2011, the MMD government went ahead and awarded Alstom a contract to provide turbines and generators worth K135 billion for the 120-megawatt Itezhi-tezhi hydroelectric project.
“We wonder what sort of due diligence was done given the many investigations that this company and its subsidiaries are facing in a number of jurisdictions. It is absolutely necessary that a procurement audit of this particularly contract is conducted by government, with the involvement of all necessary law enforcement agencies, especially the Anti Corruption Commission. It is our expectation that the Zambian government, through the Zambia Public Procurement Authority, will equally blacklist this company from participating in any future contracts,” Lifuka said.
“We further demand that the Zambian government through the Anti Corruption Commission should immediately commence investigation against the former senior government official who received the bribe that has landed Alstom in this situation of debarment. Clearly, the action of the World Bank is a good beginning but the Zambian authorities should play their role and bring this official to book.”
He advised government to seize all proceeds of crime from the official in question in order as a deterrent to all public officers engaged in public procurements.
“It is time that as a country we do everything possible to bring to an end these criminal acts of corruption. The PF government should pursue all those that were involved in this case and bring them to book, regardless of their standing in society,” Lifuka said.
“We also demand that the World Bank clearly stipulates how the K50.1 billion restitution fee will be administered specifically for the Zambian situation. It is our considered opinion that these funds should go towards compensating Zambia for the damage caused by this act of corruption by the two Alstom subsidiaries. It is evident that the bribery paid out is a cost that the Zambian government has had to pay in terms of the loans obtained for the Zambia Power Rehabilitation Project.”
He further challenged the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the African Development Bank to equally apply the debarment measures against Alstom.
“We are aware that under the Zambia Power Rehabilitation Project, Alstom subsidiaries were involved in different aspects of the rehabilitation contracts for Victoria Falls Power Station, Kariba North Bank Power Station and Kafue Gorge Hydro Power Station and government obtained credit for this project from various funding entities, including the World Bank,
EIB, AfDB and Development Bank of Southern Africa. So it makes sense that all these entities effect the blacklisting of the two Alstom subsidiaries for the same misconduct,” said Lifuka.